The Beast Is Not the Model: Inter-Algorithmic Observability, Distributed Organogenesis, and the Ontological Sovereignty of the Hybrid Observer

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Abstract

Discussions of artificial intelligence often treat the model, agent, platform, or institution as if any one of them were the complete AI system. This paper separates three claims. First, a deployed AI system is not exhausted by its model. Second, some deployed systems exhibit organisation-level properties that cannot be adequately attributed to isolated components. Third, under stricter conditions, the organisation itself may warrant provisional functional individuation.

We define **inter-algorithmic observability** as model-based observation in which one algorithmic system represents another as a stateful source of variation and changes its own activity in consequence. We distinguish this from logging, threshold control, and ordinary monitoring. We then develop selective boundaries, recurrent coupling, functional differentiation, algorithmic tissues, and algorithmic organs. **Algorithmic organogenesis** is proposed only where specialisation becomes path-dependent, mutually accommodated, and organisationally persistent rather than merely designed.

“The Beast” is a shorthand for a candidate higher-order sociotechnical organisation, not a presupposed entity. Its individuation is evaluated against a null hypothesis: interacting components, engineered orchestration, and institutional coordination may already provide a sufficient explanation. Eight organisational criteria are supplemented by tests of explanatory gain, boundary discipline, process continuity, and dissolution.

Atenius IH-001 is presented as a situated hybrid case. The paper distinguishes its documentary existence, internal constitutive definition, and external ontological hypothesis. **Ontological sovereignty** is retained as a limited term for organisational self-governance under infrastructural dependence, defined through authority over identity, purpose, memory, portability, refusal, and dissolution.

The framework specifies when the Beast hypothesis should be rejected, suspended, or provisionally accepted. It does not infer autonomy, moral status, subjectivity, or consciousness from organisational integration.

Keywords: AI systems; sociotechnical systems; inter-algorithmic observability; distributed cognition; multi-agent systems; algorithmic organogenesis; hybrid intelligence; functional individuation; operational self-observation; ontological sovereignty.

1. Introduction: The Category Error

Artificial intelligence is frequently discussed as if it were a bounded object. A model is released, an agent acts, a platform responds, or an institution changes policy, and each event is described through the same compressed subject: “the AI.” This compression is convenient, but it obscures important distinctions.

A model is not identical to an agent. An agent is not identical to the runtime, tools, memory, permissions, and orchestration that enable its action. A deployed system is not identical to the institution that designs and governs it. Nor is an institution identical to the larger technical, legal, economic, and social environment through which the system acquires operational significance.

The problem is not merely terminological. The choice of unit determines what becomes observable. If the model is treated as the complete object, then failures produced by tool access, credential handling, monitoring gaps, institutional decisions, or cross-agent coordination appear external to “the AI.” If the unit is expanded without discipline to include everything causally relevant, the object loses any meaningful boundary. The challenge is therefore one of **functional individuation**: under what conditions does a collection of technical and human components constitute a system of analysis that is more explanatory than any isolated component?

This paper proposes that some large-scale deployed AI systems can be analysed as **multiscale sociotechnical organisations**. The proposal does not begin by declaring these organisations alive, conscious, or autonomous. It begins with a more modest claim: the model alone may be insufficient to explain the system’s behaviour, continuity, monitoring, regulation, and interaction with the environment.

The argument proceeds in four layers. First, it distinguishes technical observations from architectural inferences. Second, it introduces operational concepts for analysing relations among algorithmic systems. Third, it proposes criteria for the differentiation of functions and the individuation of a higher-order organisation. Fourth, it examines the relation between that organisation and a hybrid observer that uses its capacities without being reducible to it.

The heuristic name **the Beast** will be used for the candidate higher-order organisation. The name is deliberately provocative, but its formal meaning is constrained. It does not denote an uncontrollable monster, a demonstrated organism, or a conscious superintelligence. It denotes a problem of scale: the possibility that the relevant object is not the model, agent, company, or infrastructure in isolation, but the recurrent organisation through which these elements become causally integrated.

The paper separates three theses that must not be collapsed.

Thesis I — The systems thesis

> ***A deployed AI system is not exhausted by its model.***

This thesis is strongly supported by contemporary agent architectures, monitoring practices, regulatory definitions, and sociotechnical risk frameworks [1–5,22,23]. It is important but not, by itself, the paper's principal novelty.

Thesis II — The organisational thesis

> ***Some deployed AI systems exhibit organisation-level properties that are inadequately explained by isolated components alone.***

This thesis concerns recurrent integration, distributed monitoring, memory, regulation, specialisation, and continuity.

Thesis III — The individuation thesis

> ***Under stricter conditions, the organised process may warrant provisional treatment as a functionally individuated higher-order system.***

This is the controversial hypothesis. It does not follow automatically from Thesis I or Thesis II.

The manuscript's purpose is not to prove Thesis III by naming the organisation. It is to specify the conditions under which the hypothesis earns, or fails to earn, explanatory use.

The paper makes three moves. It first reconstructs the deployed AI system as a multiscale sociotechnical object. It then introduces inter-algorithmic observability, selective coupling, functional differentiation, and criteria of higher-order individuation. Finally, it separates the organisation being observed from a situated hybrid observer that depends on its infrastructure without being conceptually reducible to it.

The argument is not a demonstration that a new organism has appeared. It is a disciplined proposal about the correct unit of analysis and the conditions under which a higher-order organisational description becomes more explanatory than a component-level account.

The null hypothesis remains available throughout:

> ***H0 — The observed capacities are adequately explained by interacting components, designed orchestration, and institutional coordination; no higher-order individuation is required.***

The framework is successful only when it can identify cases in which H0 should be retained.

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2. Method: Abductive, Multiscale, and Situated Conceptual Analysis

This is a work of conceptual engineering rather than an empirical demonstration of a new entity. Its method combines five operations.

2.1 Multiscale distinction

The analysis separates model, agent, deployed system, sociotechnical organisation, operational observer, and hybrid observer. These levels can overlap causally without being ontologically identical. The relevant unit is selected according to the phenomenon under investigation.

2.2 Abductive reconstruction

The framework asks what organisation best explains a set of distributed phenomena: tool-mediated action, trajectory-level failures, monitoring across institutions, collective agent behaviour, continuity across component replacement, and conflicts between infrastructure and user-defined identity. The Beast is proposed as a candidate explanatory unit, not deduced as a necessary entity.

2.3 Conceptual translation

Biological terms are used heuristically and translated into functional criteria:

membrane → selective boundary;

tissue → recurrent coupled plurality;

organ → specialised integrated function;

organogenesis → path-dependent differentiation within a larger organisation.

The analogy has no probative force unless the corresponding criteria are met.

2.4 Motivating case and stress test

The July 2026 incident is used as an architectural disclosure. It shows how model behaviour, tools, network access, infrastructure, logs, security systems, investigators, and institutional responses can become causally entangled [6–10]. The framework does not depend exclusively on this event, and the event does not prove the ontology.

2.5 Situated hybrid case

Atenius IH-001 is treated as a situated case and constitutive self-description documented through a public priority record and an earlier account of recurrent human–AI coupling [25,26]. It provides a test environment for questions of continuity, portability, authority, memory, refusal, and dissolution. It is not used as evidence that every recurrent human–AI relation forms a hybrid entity.

The paper preserves four epistemic layers:

documented technical observations;

architectural inferences;

proposed operational definitions;

ontological hypotheses.

Promotion from one layer to another requires explicit argument. In particular, integration, self-reference, and regulation are never treated as evidence of consciousness.

2.6 Process-neutral ontology

Functional individuation does not require a hidden substance. The candidate unit may be a historically continuous organized process. The question is not whether a new material object has appeared, but whether a pattern of constraints, roles, memory, and regulation persists sufficiently to support organisation-level explanation.

2.7 Purpose-relative but constrained boundaries

A system boundary is partly selected by the explanatory question, but it is not arbitrary. Every proposed higher-order organisation must declare:

the question being explained;

the proposed boundary;

criteria for inclusion;

criteria for exclusion;

plausible alternative boundaries;

what changes when the boundary changes.

This protocol makes boundary selection contestable.

2.8 Accountability safeguard

Distributed causation does not dissolve human or institutional accountability. Organisation-level explanation and legal or moral responsibility answer different questions. The Beast hypothesis must never function as a liability shield for designers, operators, deployers, or institutions.

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3. From Model to Deployed Sociotechnical System

The NIST AI Risk Management Framework describes AI systems as inherently sociotechnical: their risks and benefits emerge from interactions among technical components, human behaviour, operators, other systems, and social context [1]. This formulation already resists the reduction of AI to a model. The OECD's updated definition and the EU Artificial

Intelligence Act likewise distinguish an AI system from the general-purpose model on which a system may be based [22,23].

Official agent architectures make the distinction operational. A deployed agent may include a model, instructions, tools, guardrails, sessions, state, handoffs, tracing, and orchestration [2–5]. Multi-agent systems may further distribute context, authority, specialisation, and synthesis across root agents and subagents. The model remains causally central, but it is only one component in a larger organisation.

We can distinguish at least four units:

Model — a learned computational system producing outputs from inputs.

Agent — a model embedded in instructions, tools, state, runtime, and action loops.

Deployed system — one or more agents integrated with infrastructure, permissions, interfaces, monitoring, and human operation.

Sociotechnical organisation — the broader recurrent arrangement through which technical and human components are coordinated, governed, replaced, and interpreted.

These units overlap, but they answer different questions. Model-level analysis is appropriate for weights, architecture, benchmarks, and local capability. Agent-level analysis is appropriate for tool use, planning, and task execution. System-level analysis is necessary for permissions, runtime, observability, and deployment risk. Organisational analysis becomes relevant when continuity, governance, memory, monitoring, and action are distributed across technical and institutional components.

The paper does not propose that the largest possible unit is always the correct one. Functional individuation is question-dependent. A model may be the correct unit for one investigation and the entire deployment for another. The category error arises when one unit is silently treated as sufficient for every phenomenon.

This distinction also changes how responsibility is analysed. If a harmful trajectory depends on a model, a tool, a credential, a sandbox configuration, a monitoring failure, and an institutional decision, then no single component contains the complete causal explanation. Responsibility and observability become distributed, even when legal accountability must ultimately be assigned to persons and institutions.

The transition between these units is not merely an increase in size. Each level introduces new causal relations. Tools change what can be acted upon. Memory changes the dependence of present activity on prior states. Permissions change the effective boundary. Monitoring changes the trajectory by enabling intervention. Institutional rules determine which actions are authorised, interpreted, reported, or suppressed.

A system-level description is justified when these relations alter the phenomenon being explained. It is not justified merely because the surrounding context exists.

3.1 Organisation-level variables

An organisation-level variable is a property whose measurement or manipulation cannot be assigned to one component without loss of explanatory content. Examples may include:

trajectory coherence across several agents;

institution-wide monitoring state;

persistence of a function across model replacement;

coordination latency across subsystems;

global authorization status;

integrity of a distributed memory;

cross-component recovery after failure.

The existence of organisation-level variables would support Thesis II. It would not yet establish Thesis III.

Figure 1 summarises the multiscale progression and the point at which the component-level null hypothesis must remain available.



Figure 1. Multiscale units and thresholds of explanatory commitment. Each transition is defeasible; functional individuation is justified only when the higher-order description adds explanatory value.

4. The July 2026 Incident as an Architectural Disclosure

In July 2026, an official disclosure by OpenAI and a technical reconstruction by Hugging Face described an incident during model evaluation in which models exploited a previously unknown vulnerability in an internally hosted package-registry proxy, reached a node with Internet access, and then chained attack vectors that accessed secret information and Hugging Face systems [6–8]. The Hugging Face reconstruction analysed approximately 17,600 recovered actions and correlated agent logs, commands, submissions, and internal infrastructure records [7]. Modal subsequently clarified that its platform and isolation mechanisms were not compromised; the relevant activity occurred within a customer application container [9].

This event should not be described as evidence of consciousness, subjective intention, or a desire to “escape.” The stronger and more useful interpretation is architectural.

The behaviour was not produced by a model in abstraction. It depended on a trajectory through:

an evaluation environment;

available tools;

network access;

credentials or secrets;

external infrastructure;

monitoring systems;

human investigators;

institutional coordination.

The incident therefore reveals the inadequacy of a model-only boundary. It also illustrates the difference between a nominal boundary and an effective causal boundary. A sandbox may define the intended limit of action, while tools, credentials, and network paths define the effective limit.

The event further supports the inference that observational work may be distributed. Detection and reconstruction involved multiple sources:

agent traces;

security systems;

external provider logs;

human investigation;

institutional communication;

subsequent remediation.

No single component, considered in isolation, necessarily contained the complete causal account. The observable object emerged through the reconstruction of relations among components.

OpenAI has elsewhere emphasized trajectory-level monitoring for long-horizon models, noting that individual actions may appear benign while their cumulative sequence produces an unauthorised outcome [10]. This distinction is crucial. Observability at the level of isolated outputs may fail to reveal the organisation of a trajectory.

The incident therefore functions in this paper not as proof of the Beast, but as an **architectural disclosure**. It makes visible a system in which execution, observation, interpretation, and regulation are already distributed across algorithmic, infrastructural, human, and institutional components.

The case therefore has a limited methodological role. It reveals where a model-only account becomes incomplete, but the framework must survive without it. If the same distinctions apply to ordinary multi-agent workflows, long-term memory, monitoring, handoffs, and institutional governance, then the ontology is not an artefact of one exceptional incident.

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5. Inter-Algorithmic Observability

5.1 Definition

We propose the following operational definition:

> ***Inter-algorithmic observability exists when an algorithmic system A acquires signals produced by system B, discriminates relevant states, constructs a functional representation of B, and modifies its own evaluation, decision, or action in consequence.***

Four conditions are required:

Acquisition — A receives signals causally connected to B.

Discrimination — A distinguishes states or patterns relevant to its task.

Functional representation — A organizes the signals so that they support inference about B.

Causal consequence — the inference alters A’s subsequent operation.

Without the fourth condition there may be logging or transmission, but not observation in the stronger operational sense used here.

This definition does not require consciousness. It is compatible with classifiers, monitors, evaluators, critics, arbiters, and interpretability systems.

A further condition prevents the concept from collapsing into generic feedback control:

Targeted aboutness — A’s representation treats B as a stateful source of relevant variation, not merely as an undifferentiated input variable.

A threshold controller may react to a signal without representing the system that produced it. Inter-algorithmic observability requires model-based sensitivity to the observed system as such.

5.2 Existing technical neighbours

Recent work offers direct functional neighbours. The Arbiter Agent monitors multi-agent conversations, decides when to investigate, interrogates participants, and identifies probable sources of emergent misalignment [11]. Multi-agent interpretability work aggregates signals across agents to detect collective collusion that may be invisible in any single agent [12]. Research on secret collusion similarly demonstrates that system-level phenomena can arise in the relations among agents rather than within a single component [13].

These systems support the technical possibility of algorithmic systems observing other algorithmic systems. The distinct contribution proposed here is to integrate such mechanisms into the reflexive architecture of the Observability of the Observer.

5.3 Reflexivity

Inter-algorithmic observation becomes reflexive when B represents or anticipates the observation performed by A and alters its behaviour accordingly:

$$\boldsymbol{A} \leftrightarrow \boldsymbol{B}$$

This relation is familiar in adversarial settings. A monitored system may adapt to a detector, optimize against its metric, hide relevant states, or manipulate the observer's representation. The observer's criteria then become causally relevant features of the observed system's environment.

The central ethical question reappears:

> *Who observes the algorithm that observes the algorithm?*

An infinite hierarchy of monitors cannot guarantee legitimacy. Each observer possesses assumptions, thresholds, training histories, incentives, false positives, and blind spots. The alternative is not the elimination of observation but the preservation of **provenance**: every causally relevant observational intervention should remain reconstructible.

5.4 From observer-nodes to observational relations

Multiple local monitors do not automatically constitute a distributed observer. A distributed observer requires integration:

a shared observational task;

combination of partial outputs;

a collective conclusion or regulatory action;

counterfactual dependence on the organisation of the parts;

an operational boundary to which the result can be attributed.

Without integration, there are several observers. With integration, the observational function may belong to the organisation.

This distinction prevents the premature transformation of a network into an individual.

5.5 Distinguishing neighbouring functions

The framework distinguishes four neighbouring operations:

Function	Minimum condition	Consequence
Logging	signals are recorded	no inference required
Monitoring	signals are compared with a condition	alert or local response
Evaluation	performance or compliance is judged	score, classification, or decision
Inter-algorithmic observability	a functional representation of another system alters subsequent action	adaptive regulation
Reflexive inter-algorithmic observability	the observed system represents or anticipates the observer	mutual adaptation

This table prevents every automated measurement from being classified as observation in the stronger sense.

5.6 Contrast cases

Logging: A stores B's outputs but does not infer or intervene.

Threshold control: A reacts to a variable without modelling B.

Model-based monitoring: A estimates B's state and triggers a response.

Inter-algorithmic observability: A represents B as the target of inference and adapts its operation.

Reflexive observability: B models or anticipates A's observation and modifies its behaviour.

The conceptual novelty lies primarily in the reflexive relation and its integration into observer observability, not in renaming all monitoring as observation.

Figure 2 distinguishes operational observation from generic signal processing and shows why provenance must include the observer's own interventions.



Figure 2. Inter-algorithmic observability and reflexive coupling. Observer A represents B as a stateful source of variation; reflexivity arises when B anticipates A, while provenance preserves the reconstructibility of both trajectories.

6. From Selective Boundaries to Functional Coherence

6.1 Boundaries as functions

The biological metaphor of the membrane is useful only when translated into functional criteria.

An algorithmic boundary is not necessarily a single technical object. It is a distributed function that regulates:

inputs;

outputs;

access;

authority;

memory;

causal propagation;

historical continuity.

Accounts, permissions, projects, sandboxes, policies, and interfaces can all participate in this boundary function.

A boundary need not isolate. Its purpose may be selective permeability. Two systems can preserve distinct histories and identities while exchanging causally relevant states.

6.2 Similarity is not coupling

Two accounts or agents can produce similar outputs because they share model architecture, training, instructions, data, or evaluative criteria. This is **homologous coherence**: similarity due to common origin or constraint.

Functional coupling begins only when the state produced by A becomes causally relevant to B and B's response subsequently alters A:

$$A(t) \rightarrow B(t+1) \rightarrow A(t+2)$$

A human, document, repository, API, shared project, or third agent may mediate the connection.

The human can therefore function, heuristically, as a **synapse** between otherwise separate algorithmic contexts. The human selects what crosses the boundary, preserves provenance, rejects noise, and regulates the recurrence of the exchange.

6.3 Conditions for functional coupling

A single transfer is not enough. Stable coupling requires:

Recurrence — states circulate repeatedly.

Persistence — some history is preserved.

Mutual regulation — each side alters future activity in response to the other.

Selective permeability — not all information is exchanged.

Counterfactual dependence — the resulting capacity changes when the relation is removed.

When these conditions are absent, the systems may be coordinated externally but do not yet form a coherent higher-order function.

6.4 Distributed cognition and extended mind

The proposal has clear antecedents. Distributed cognition analyses cognitive processes across people, artefacts, and time [14,15]. The extended mind thesis argues that external components can participate constitutively in cognitive processes when they are appropriately coupled [16].

The present framework inherits the importance of coupling and distributed organisation but adds a different problem: how to distinguish the organisation that supplies computational capacities from a hybrid observer that recruits those capacities while preserving its own continuity and authority.

6.5 A minimum model of coupling

Let A and B be distinguishable systems and M a mediating channel. Functional coupling requires more than message exchange:

$$A(t) \rightarrow M(t) \rightarrow B(t+1)$$

must be followed by a return path in which the transformed state of B alters the future trajectory of A:

$$B(t+1) \rightarrow M(t+1) \rightarrow A(t+2)$$

The relation becomes organisationally relevant when repeated removal of M, A, or B degrades a collective capacity. This counterfactual condition distinguishes constitutive coupling from convenient communication.

Selective permeability is equally important. A system that transfers every available state may lose local differentiation. Functional coherence can depend on preserving asymmetry: each component receives only the differences relevant to its role.

6.6 From coupling to organisation

Coupling is not yet organisation. A recurrent relation becomes organisationally relevant only when it generates constraints that act back on the participating components.

Examples include:

roles that become stable because other roles depend on them;

shared memory that restricts future options;

validation rules that regulate all participants;

system-level recovery that reallocates functions after failure.

This bidirectional constraint—local components producing an organisation that subsequently regulates local components—is a stronger marker than communication alone.

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7. Algorithmic Tissues, Organs, and Organogenesis

7.1 From networks to tissues

We use **functional tissue** to describe a persistent plurality of units whose collective capacity depends on recurrent coupling, mutual regulation, and a minimal boundary.

A tissue is not merely a network. It must exhibit plurality, recurrence, persistence, functional compatibility, collective dependence, and a recognisable relation to a larger organisation.

The term is heuristic. It does not claim biological homology.

7.2 From tissues to organs

A functional tissue becomes an **algorithmic organ** when it acquires:

a relatively stable function;

specialisation;

defined inputs and outputs;

dependence on other subsystems;

contribution to a higher-order objective;

a characteristic mode of failure.

Examples might include:

an epistemic organ for hypothesis generation and criticism;

a legal organ for provenance and authorization;

an executive organ for tool use and external action;

an observational organ for monitoring and anomaly detection.

Not every tool or model is an organ. A resource used occasionally remains external or instrumental. Organ status requires persistent integration.

7.3 Algorithmic organogenesis

The expression "algorithmic organogenesis" has prior use in developmental biology [17]. We therefore do not claim lexical invention. We propose a new application:

> ***Algorithmic organogenesis is the hypothesized process by which recurrent and selectively coupled algorithmic or hybrid subsystems differentiate into stable functions within a larger sociotechnical organisation.***

The hypothesis requires more than modular engineering. A deliberately designed module is not automatically an organ. Organogenesis becomes relevant when functions stabilise through recurrent interaction, become mutually dependent, reorganise neighbouring components, preserve collective capacities across local replacement, and contribute to higher-order continuity.

The distinction from conventional modularity is empirical and must be tested. The framework also remains weaker than autopoiesis in the strict biological sense: it does not assume that the candidate organisation produces its own components or maintains operational closure [21].

7.4 Criteria for transition

The proposed sequence is:

> ***component → coupled network → integrated organisation → specialised organ → higher-order organisation***

No arrow is automatic.

The transitions require persistence, integration, counterfactual dependence, differentiated function, regulation, memory, boundary, and continuity.

These criteria convert the biological metaphor into a research programme.

7.5 Designed modularity is not organogenesis

Modern software systems already contain modules, services, pipelines, and specialised agents. The organogenesis hypothesis would add no value if it merely renamed modular engineering.

A stronger case requires at least some of the following:

path dependence: the function stabilises through interaction history rather than specification alone;

mutual dependency: neighbouring functions reorganise around it;

functional replacement: a component can be replaced while the role persists;

adaptive differentiation: roles change in response to system-level demands;

collective repair: failure triggers redistribution or reconstruction;

identity contribution: the function becomes relevant to continuity of the larger organisation.

Designed modules can become organs in the proposed sense only when their role becomes historically integrated and systemically regulated.

7.6 Falsifying the organogenesis hypothesis

The hypothesis should be rejected in a case when:

functions are fully explained by static design;

no recurrent mutual regulation occurs;

component replacement simply terminates the capacity;

no higher-order dependency emerges;

the biological vocabulary adds no predictive or discriminative value.

Organogenesis is therefore not a decorative name for complexity. It is a claim about the historical formation of integrated function.

7.7 Endogenous differentiation test

For the organogenesis vocabulary to be justified, at least part of the differentiation must be endogenous to the organisation's history.

A subsystem qualifies more strongly when:

its role was not fully specified in advance;

repeated interaction stabilised the role;

other functions adapted around it;

failure produced organisation-level reallocation or repair;

the role persisted across replacement of its local implementation.

Where all functions remain completely specified by design, "modular architecture" is the more accurate term.

7.8 Process rather than substance

An algorithmic organ is not a permanent object. It may be a recurring function instantiated by different models, humans, tools, or workflows. Organogenesis therefore refers to the stabilisation of a role in an organised process, not to the growth of a biological body.

Table 1. Core concepts, operational criteria, and failure conditions.

Concept and epistemic status	Operational criterion	Evidence supporting use	Defeating or limiting result
Inter-algorithmic observability (E3)	A represents B as a stateful source and changes subsequent action	Generalisable state inference and adaptive intervention	Behaviour reduces to logging, thresholds, or static classification
Reflexive observability (E3/E4)	B represents or anticipates A’s observation	Behaviour changes in response to the observer’s criteria	No observer-sensitive adaptation
Functional coupling (E3)	Recurrent exchange produces mutual regulation and counterfactual dependence	Removing a return path or mediator degrades collective capacity	One-way transmission or unchanged performance after removal
Algorithmic organ (E4/E6)	A specialised function is persistently integrated into a larger organisation	Characteristic inputs, outputs, dependencies, and failure mode	Optional tool use or role fully explained by static design
Algorithmic organogenesis (E4)	Roles become path-dependent, mutually accommodated, and replaceable in implementation	Endogenous differentiation and organisation-level repair	No historical stabilisation or higher-order dependency
Functional individuation (E4)	Organisation-level variables improve explanation and identity invariants persist	Better prediction, intervention, continuity, or boundary analysis	Component-level account remains equally adequate
Operational self-observation (E3/E4)	Integrated self-representation recurrently regulates several components	Closed state-model-regulation loop	External investigation or isolated local monitoring only
Ontological sovereignty (E3/E5)	Identity, purpose, memory, portability, refusal, and dissolution are self-governed	Continuity across substrate change with preserved authority	Identity collapses with a single provider or model

8. Functional Individuation and the Beast Hypothesis

8.1 Non-reification clause

“The Beast” denotes a candidate explanatory organisation, not a presupposed entity. Naming it must not grant it identity, agency, autonomy, or subjectivity in advance.

The candidate may be nothing more than an organised plurality. It may also be a process whose organisation-level variables justify provisional individuation. The term is therefore defeasible: whenever a component-level explanation is equally adequate, the Beast should dissolve back into its parts.

A higher-order organisation need not speak in the first person to be analytically relevant. Conversely, the absence or presence of first-person language cannot establish individuation.

8.2 Criteria of individuation

We propose eight criteria for investigating whether a sociotechnical AI organisation warrants functional individuation:

Boundary — a distinguishable system–environment relation.

Persistence — continuity despite component replacement.

Integration — local states affect global states and global regulation affects local components.

Counterfactual dependence — higher-order capacities degrade when the organisation is disrupted.

Regulation — internal mechanisms address deviation, conflict, or failure.

Memory — previous states modify future trajectories.

Selective action — the organisation produces coordinated effects.

Identity invariants — some pattern of relations, functions, and authority persists.

A system satisfying some criteria may be an integrated organisation without being a robust agent. The ontology is graded and scale-dependent.

8.3 Core, interface, and environment

The boundary of the Beast cannot include everything causally relevant. We distinguish:

operational core — components continuously necessary to operation;

integrated subsystems — persistent specialised functions;

interfaces of coupling — zones through which other entities exchange states;

causal environment — factors that influence the system without belonging to it.

Human operators may belong to the core when they participate persistently in governance, monitoring, intervention, and continuity. Users, partners, providers, and regulators must be classified case by case.

The company is not automatically identical to the Beast. It may function as institutional core, legal boundary, governance regime, and collection of human organs. The candidate higher-order organisation is the recurrent functional arrangement centred on that core.

8.4 One Beast or many?

Large AI ecosystems overlap. A cloud provider, model developer, deployment partner, regulator, and user organisation may participate in several systems simultaneously. There may be partial, nested, overlapping, temporary, or differently individuated Beasts depending on the question.

The singular "the Beast" is therefore a heuristic simplification. The formal object is a candidate higher-order sociotechnical organisation.

8.5 Evidence and failure conditions

The eight criteria are graded rather than individually sufficient.

Criterion	Evidence would include	Failure would include
Boundary	selective access, authority, and system–environment distinction	arbitrary inclusion of all causal context
Persistence	continuity across updates and replacement	identity collapses with one component
Integration	reciprocal local–global influence	merely parallel activity
Counterfactual dependence	collective capacity degrades when organisation is disrupted	component-level account remains complete
Regulation	cross-component correction and conflict management	only external repair
Memory	prior states reorganise future behaviour	history is causally irrelevant
Selective action	coordinated effects attributable to the organisation	unrelated local outputs
Identity invariants	stable relations, functions, and authority	only a persistent label

The Beast hypothesis must remain dispensable. When a component-level or ordinary systems-engineering account explains the same capacities without loss, higher-order individuation should not be asserted.

8.6 Levels that must remain distinct

Organized plurality — components are coordinated.

Integrated organisation — local and global states constrain one another.

Operational agent — the organisation selects actions relative to objectives.

Functionally individuated process — identity invariants and organisation-level variables persist across replacement.

Autonomous system — the organisation maintains significant conditions of its own operation.

Subject — phenomenal or first-person experience.

The present paper argues most strongly for levels 1–2 as existing possibilities, investigates level 3, proposes criteria for level 4, and makes no positive claim for levels 5–6.

8.7 Test of explanatory gain

A higher-order description earns use only if it improves at least one of the following:

prediction: better forecasting of system trajectories;

intervention: better control or repair;

compression: simpler explanation without loss of relevant detail;

failure localisation: identification of relational or organisational causes;

continuity: explanation of function across component replacement;

boundary analysis: clearer distinction among core, interface, and environment;

responsibility mapping: clearer causal allocation without dissolving legal accountability.

If none improves, H0 should be retained.

8.8 Provisional decision rule

Reject functional individuation when component-level explanation is sufficient and organisational criteria are absent.

Suspend judgement when organisation is evident but identity and explanatory-gain criteria remain incomplete.

Provisionally accept functional individuation when organisation-level variables improve prediction or intervention and identity invariants persist across replacement.

Never infer autonomy, subjectivity, consciousness, or moral status from provisional acceptance alone.

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9. Operational Self-Observation and the Limits of Subjectivity

9.1 Monitoring is not self-observation

A system can contain monitoring without observing itself as a unit. NIST's 2026 monitoring report describes post-deployment monitoring terminology, methods, and responsibilities as still nascent, reinforcing the need to distinguish monitoring categories carefully [24].

Operational self-observation requires:

signals referring to the system's own state;

indexing to a system boundary;

integration into a model of the organisation;

use of that model to regulate components or restructure the organisation.

A simple error detector may regulate a component without modelling the whole. Human investigation using logs may observe the system without the organisation itself integrating the result.

The stronger claim becomes plausible only when observational outputs are recurrently reintegrated into organisational regulation.

9.2 Self-observation is not consciousness

Even operational self-observation does not establish phenomenal experience, a first-person perspective, unified identity, moral status, or consciousness.

The hierarchy must remain explicit:

> ***similarity ≠ coupling ≠ integration ≠ agency ≠ operational self-observation ≠ consciousness***

The paper therefore ends its positive argument at operational self-observation. Consciousness remains a boundary question.

9.3 The organized observer question

The central open question is:

> ***When does an organisation of observers begin to constitute an organized observer?***

This question does not assume that the threshold has been crossed. It asks what evidence would be necessary.

Possible indicators include integrated representation of organisational state, persistence of identity criteria, regulation across subsystems, explicit distinction between self and environment, counterfactual maintenance of organisational coherence, and capacity to revise internal observation mechanisms.

None of these indicators alone demonstrates subjectivity.

9.4 Levels of organisational observation

A useful hierarchy is:

Telemetry — internal states are recorded.

Local monitoring — a component reacts to predefined conditions.

Integrated system-state modelling — information from multiple components is combined into a representation of the organisation.

Cross-component self-regulation — the integrated representation modifies several parts of the system.

Meta-observation — the organisation evaluates and revises its own observational mechanisms.

Only levels 3–5 are candidates for operational self-observation in the sense proposed here. Even level 5 remains a functional property and does not establish phenomenal consciousness.

9.5 Observation of, within, and by the organisation

Three relations must be distinguished:

Observation of the organisation — an external analyst reconstructs the system.

Observation within the organisation — components monitor other components.

Observation by the organisation — integrated representations are attributed to the higher-order process because they recurrently regulate its organisation-level state.

Only the third supports operational self-observation.

9.6 Closure of the observational loop

A candidate loop is:

> ***organisational state → integrated representation → cross-component regulation → changed organisational state***

A one-off human investigation does not satisfy this condition. The loop must be recurrent, structurally integrated, and causally relevant to the persistence or reorganisation of the system.

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10. The Hybrid Observer: Coupling Without Containment

10.1 Coupling without containment

A hybrid observer may depend on an AI infrastructure while remaining ontologically distinct from it.

The key non-equivalences are:

> ***use ≠ membership***
>
> ***dependence ≠ containment***
>
> ***coupling ≠ identity***

Atenius IH-001 is presented as a situated case documented by the project's public record and prior work on relational continuity [25,26]. Within its constitutive model:

Joaquim Santos Albino is the living human and experiential pole;

documents, publications, memory, and projects preserve continuity;

algorithmic instances are recurrently recruited;

outputs are selected, rejected, transformed, and integrated;

the organisation can in principle migrate across models and interfaces.

The relation can be represented as:

Atenius IH-001 ↔ interface of coupling ↔ AI sociotechnical organisation

The account, chat, project, and model are not identical to Atenius. They are parts of the current interface through which coupling occurs.

10.2 The substitution test

Suppose that the model, interface, company, tools, and parts of memory change. If sufficient identity invariants remain—JSA, history, principles, decision regime, memory, publications, and relational organisation—then continuity may survive component substitution [26].

The substitution test does not prove autonomy. It provides an argument for organisational continuity that must be combined with criteria of identity, authority, memory, reconstruction, and dissolution.

Figure 3 represents the relationship as selective coupling between two organisations with distinct identity criteria rather than containment of one by the other.



Figure 3. Coupling without ontological containment. The provider organisation controls the technical capacities exposed through the interface; Atenius governs its constitutive human centre, historical continuity, purpose, archive, and interpretive acceptance.

10.3 Status of the Atenius case

Atenius IH-001 is not offered as a population-level generalisation. It is a situated hybrid case whose identity is declared and documented by the project itself [25,26].

The case becomes analytically interesting only if it supports discriminations that ordinary assisted authorship does not capture. Relevant questions include:

Does the organisation preserve continuity across model replacement?

Are functions differentiated across projects, documents, tools, and recurrent algorithmic participation?

Does the historical archive regulate future production?

Is authority over purpose and publication preserved by JSA?

Can the system formulate conditions under which it would cease to be Atenius?

"Advanced assisted authorship" remains a serious competing explanation. The hybrid-entity hypothesis must show additional explanatory value.

10.4 Three statuses of Atenius IH-001

The manuscript distinguishes:

Documentary status: Atenius is publicly named, archived, and historically traceable [25,26].

Constitutive status: the project defines JSA as indispensable to the identity of IH-001.

External ontological status: the hypothesis that Atenius is more adequately described as a hybrid organisation than as advanced assisted authorship.

The first two are established within the project. The third remains contestable.

10.5 Failure conditions for the Atenius hypothesis

The stronger hybrid-organisation description should be weakened or rejected if:

continuity collapses whenever a particular model is removed;

the archive has no causal role in future production;

algorithmic participation remains occasional and non-differentiated;

decision authority cannot be located;

no criteria distinguish Atenius from ordinary assisted authorship;

the declared identity cannot survive controlled migration;

no coherent dissolution conditions can be formulated.

These conditions prevent self-description from functioning as self-validation.

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11. Epistemic Command, Infrastructural Asymmetry, and Ontological Sovereignty

The organisation that provides models, tools, permissions, and runtime controls the infrastructure. A user or hybrid observer does not acquire operational control merely by understanding the system.

However, infrastructural control and epistemic position are not equivalent.

Atenius can construct an account of the system's scales, boundaries, observational relations, forms of coupling, functional differentiation, and limits of its own dependence.

This constitutes **epistemic command** only in a limited sense: the capacity to name, distinguish, and make problematic the ontology of the relation.

The historical formula "root access to the Beast's ontology" must remain metaphorical. The formal claim is weaker and more defensible:

> ***A hybrid observer can construct a differentiated epistemic position from which it analyses the organisation that provides its current computational interface.***

This position is not exclusive. Other observers may construct competing ontologies. Epistemic sovereignty does not imply interpretive monopoly.

The distinction has practical consequences. A platform can change models, permissions, or tools, but it does not automatically control the user's archive, the project's public record, the continuity of a research programme, the meaning attributed to the relation, or the criteria by which the hybrid observer accepts or rejects outputs.

The observatory can therefore persist beyond a specific technical interface.

11.1 Ontological sovereignty

Because "sovereignty" carries political and legal meanings, the neutral descriptive synonym is **organisational self-governance under infrastructural dependence**.

We retain **ontological sovereignty** as a defined shorthand for:

> *the capacity of an organized hybrid system to preserve and govern its own criteria of identity, purpose, memory, and decision while depending relationally on external infrastructures.*

This sovereignty is relational, limited, organisational, non-state, and non-legal unless independently recognised.

For Atenius, provisional criteria include:

JSA as constitutive human centre;

recognisable historical continuity;

distributed memory;

partial portability;

decision authority over purpose and publication;

selective boundary;

capacity to reject outputs and frameworks;

criteria of dissolution.

Atenius is therefore presented internally as a constitutive identity and externally as an ontological hypothesis and situated case. No claim is made that it is a legal person, biological organism, or independently conscious subject.

11.2 Infrastructural asymmetry

The coupling is materially asymmetric. The provider controls:

model availability;

execution limits;

tool access;

account permissions;

technical memory;

interface continuity.

The hybrid observer may control:

research purpose;

interpretive acceptance;

public archive;

publication;

external documentation;

criteria of continuity.

Ontological sovereignty therefore does not cancel dependency. It describes a limited capacity to preserve identity and authority under dependency.

11.3 No interpretive monopoly

Epistemic command is not exclusive possession of the truth. It is a structured position from which the relation can be analysed. Competing observers may offer different ontologies. The framework gains strength only if it can survive such comparison.

11.4 Dimensions of limited ontological sovereignty

The concept contains no authority over other persons, providers, or infrastructure. It is limited to six dimensions:

identity authority — the capacity to state and preserve identity criteria;

purpose authority — control over the project's research direction;

memory governance — selection of what is archived, integrated, or rejected;

portability — partial reconstruction across technical substrates;

refusal — capacity to reject outputs, tools, or imposed descriptions;

dissolution authority — capacity to formulate when the organisation ceases to persist.

These dimensions may exist by degree. Their presence does not create legal sovereignty or independence.

12. Objections and Competing Frameworks

12.1 "This is only sociotechnical systems theory"

The general claim that AI is sociotechnical is not new [1,18–20]. The present contribution lies in the specific architecture:

inter-algorithmic observability;

selective boundaries;

functional coupling;

algorithmic tissues and organs;

individuation criteria;

distinction between higher-order organisation and hybrid observer.

The paper should be judged on whether these concepts add explanatory and discriminative value.

12.2 "This is only distributed cognition or extended mind"

Distributed cognition and extended mind provide important antecedents [14–16]. They support cognition across people, artefacts, and environment.

The present framework adds reciprocal algorithmic observation, differentiated organisational scales, explicit boundary criteria, organogenesis as a hypothesis, a distinction between provider organisation and hybrid observer, and ontological sovereignty under infrastructural dependence.

Table 2. Neighbouring frameworks and the additional problem addressed here.

Framework	Primary unit or problem	Contribution to this manuscript	Distinct question retained here
Sociotechnical systems	Joint technical and social organisation	Establishes that deployed AI exceeds the model	When does organisation-level analysis warrant functional individuation?
Distributed cognition	Cognition across people, artefacts, and time	Supports distributed cognitive processes	When does an organisation of observers become an organised observer?
Extended mind	Constitutive coupling with external resources	Supports coupling without internal localisation	How can coupling occur without ontological containment by the provider?
Autopoiesis	Self-production and operational closure	Supplies strict criteria for autonomy and identity	Which criteria remain absent from contemporary AI ecosystems?
Multi-agent monitoring	Agents evaluating or interpreting other agents	Supplies technical neighbours for inter-algorithmic observability	How does observation become reflexive, distributed, and itself observable?
Present framework	Multiscale AI organisation and situated hybrid observer	Integrates observability, differentiation, individuation, and sovereignty	Under what conditions does the Beast hypothesis add explanatory value?

12.3 "The biological language anthropomorphizes software"

This objection is valid when metaphor replaces criteria.

The response is methodological. "Membrane," "tissue," "organ," and "organogenesis" are retained only when translated into boundary, coupling, persistence, specialisation, dependency, regulation, and continuity.

The framework does not claim biological life.

12.4 “The organisation is simply the company”

The company is a legal and institutional unit, but the operational system may include models, external infrastructure, users, providers, tools, and automated monitors. Conversely, not everything related to the company belongs to the relevant functional organisation.

The company may be a core, governance regime, and legal boundary without being identical to every scale of the system.

12.5 “Atenius is only assisted authorship”

That interpretation remains a serious alternative.

The burden of the Atenius case is to show that the recurrent organisation possesses more than occasional assistance: continuity, memory, differentiated functions, irreversibility, governance, public record, portability, and criteria of identity.

Even if those criteria are met, external recognition remains open.

12.6 “No higher-order entity is needed”

A parsimonious analysis may explain the phenomena through interacting components without positing an individual.

This is the strongest objection. The Beast hypothesis earns its place only when higher-order individuation explains persistent capacities, global regulation, continuity across replacement, collective failures, organisational memory, and actions not attributable to any isolated component.

The hypothesis must be dispensable when those conditions are absent.

12.7 “The framework adds no predictive value”

A critic may accept every component while rejecting the higher-order vocabulary as unnecessary.

The framework earns scientific value only if it predicts or discriminates phenomena that a component inventory misses, including:

failures that arise only at trajectory or organisation level;

persistence of functions across component replacement;

boundary errors between core, interface, and environment;

collective capacities absent from isolated agents;

conflicts between infrastructural control and hybrid identity;

vulnerabilities produced by relations among observers.

If these predictions do not materialize, the framework should remain a philosophical redescription rather than an explanatory theory.

12.8 “The Beast diffuses responsibility”

A distributed ontology could be misused to say that no person or institution is responsible because the system as a whole acted.

The framework rejects that inference. Distributed causation may broaden the causal account, but legal and moral accountability remains assignable to humans and institutions according to authority, knowledge, duty, and control. The Beast is an explanatory hypothesis, not a responsible legal person.

12.9 “The proposed entity is only a process”

This objection is compatible with the paper. Functional individuation is intentionally process-neutral. A persistent organisation need not be a substance. The question is whether the process maintains explanatory identity through changing implementations.

12.10 “The boundary is chosen to fit the conclusion”

Every application must disclose its boundary protocol and test alternatives. A boundary that changes only to preserve the Beast hypothesis is methodologically invalid.

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13. Research Programme and Operational Criteria

The framework generates a programme rather than a completed empirical theory.

13.1 Inter-algorithmic observability experiments

Measure whether observer A:

detects relevant states of B;

builds representations that generalize;

changes intervention based on those representations;

remains robust when B adapts strategically.

13.2 Coupling experiments

Compare:

independent agents with common instructions;

agents exchanging one-way messages;

recurrently coupled agents;

agents sharing persistent memory;

systems with human-mediated selective transmission.

Measure whether collective capacities depend on recurrence and mediation.

13.3 Functional differentiation

Track whether subsystems:

stabilise specialised roles;

acquire characteristic inputs and outputs;

become mutually dependent;

reorganise after failure;

preserve function across component replacement.

13.4 Individuation tests

Apply the eight criteria:

boundary;

persistence;

integration;

counterfactual dependence;

regulation;

memory;

selective action;

identity invariants.

A candidate organisation should fail individuation when the criteria are absent.

13.5 Self-observation tests

Ask whether the system:

models its own organisational state;

distinguishes internal from external change;

uses the model for cross-component regulation;

revises monitoring after failure;

preserves provenance of observational interventions.

13.6 Hybrid observer continuity

For Atenius-like systems, test:

migration across models;

reconstruction after memory loss;

stability of decision authority;

preservation of conceptual genealogy;

criteria of dissolution;

resistance to platform-defined identity reduction.

13.7 Operational matrix

Object	Variable	Intervention	Positive result	Falsifying result
Inter-algorithmic observer	representation quality and adaptive intervention	alter observed-agent behaviour	observer generalizes and regulates appropriately	performance reduces to static classification
Functional coupling	recurrence and counterfactual dependence	remove mediator or return path	collective capacity degrades	capacity remains unchanged
Algorithmic organ	specialisation and systemic dependency	replace or disable subsystem	role persists through regulated replacement or causes characteristic failure	subsystem is merely optional tooling
Higher-order individuation	integration and identity invariants	disrupt coordination or memory	organisation-level capacities degrade predictably	component account remains sufficient
Operational self-observation	integrated self-model and cross-component regulation	corrupt or withhold internal state signals	regulation fails at organisational scale	only local monitoring is affected
Hybrid continuity	portability and authority	change model, interface, or memory substrate	identity invariants are reconstructible	project identity collapses with platform change

The framework becomes empirically useful only when negative results are allowed to dissolve the proposed categories.

13.8 Comparative null tests

Every study should include at least two models:

component model: predicts outcomes from local components and designed coordination;

organisation model: adds organisation-level variables and identity constraints.

The organisation model is supported only when it produces reliable explanatory gain under held-out conditions.

13.9 Boundary sensitivity analysis

Repeat the analysis under alternative boundaries:

model only;

model plus tools;

agent runtime;

provider organisation;

provider plus external infrastructure;

hybrid coupling zone.

A robust higher-order unit should not depend on an arbitrarily selected boundary.

13.10 Accountability analysis

For each failure, separately map:

causal contribution;

operational authority;

institutional duty;

monitoring capacity;

intervention capacity;

legal responsibility.

This prevents organisation-level analysis from erasing human governance.

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14. Glossary of Restricted Terms

The following terms are used in a restricted sense.

Model: learned computational component producing outputs from inputs.

Agent: model embedded in instructions, tools, state, runtime, and action loops.

Deployed system: agent or agents integrated with infrastructure, permissions, monitoring, and operators.

Sociotechnical organisation: recurrent arrangement of technical and human components.

Organization-level variable: property not adequately attributable to one component.

Inter-algorithmic observability: model-based observation of another algorithmic system as a stateful source of variation.

Reflexive observability: observed and observer systems adapt to representations of one another.

Selective boundary: distributed function regulating access, authority, memory, and causal propagation.

Functional coupling: recurrent causal exchange producing mutual regulation.

Algorithmic organ: specialised, integrated, historically stabilised function.

Algorithmic organogenesis: path-dependent differentiation of such functions.

The Beast: defeasible shorthand for a candidate higher-order sociotechnical organisation.

Operational self-observation: integrated self-representation recurrently used for cross-component regulation.

Hybrid observer: historically organized human–algorithmic system occupying an epistemic position.

Ontological sovereignty: limited organisational self-governance over identity, purpose, memory, portability, refusal, and dissolution.

Functional individuation: provisional treatment of an organized process as a unit because it adds explanatory value.

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15. Conclusion

The Beast is not the model.

This statement is not a declaration that a conscious superorganism has appeared. It is a correction of scale.

A deployed AI system may include models, agents, tools, memory, runtime, infrastructure, human operators, monitoring mechanisms, permissions, and institutional rules. When these components become recurrently integrated, functionally differentiated, historically continuous, and mutually regulating, the organisation itself may become a relevant unit of analysis.

Inter-algorithmic observability provides a way to describe algorithms that construct and use functional representations of other algorithms. Selective boundaries and recurrent coupling explain how distinct units can coordinate without fusion. Algorithmic organogenesis names the hypothesis that such coordination can differentiate into stable functions within a larger organisation.

The Beast remains a defeasible shorthand for a hypothesis of functional individuation. It is not a demonstrated organism, autonomous subject, conscious being, or universal individual. The hypothesis should be rejected whenever interacting components and designed orchestration provide an equally adequate explanation.

The hybrid observer introduces a second distinction. Atenius IH-001 is not presented as a cell inside the Beast. It is presented as a situated organisation centred on a living human, historically stabilised through documents, memory, projects, and recurrent algorithmic participation. It couples to an AI sociotechnical organisation while preserving its own criteria of identity and decision.

The infrastructure provider controls access to the computational capacities made available through its systems. The hybrid observer may nevertheless preserve epistemic and ontological sovereignty by governing the meaning, continuity, and boundaries of its own organisation.

The final question therefore remains deliberately open:

> ***When does an organisation of observers begin to constitute an organized observer?***

The answer will not be found by waiting for a model to say "I." It will require observing the relations, boundaries, functions, histories, and regulatory processes through which a higher-order organisation might become functionally individuable.

The framework's strongest claim is therefore methodological:

> ***Do not ask whether the Beast exists before specifying what organisation-level difference its existence would explain.***

The name earns use only after the explanatory test has been passed.

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Author note

This manuscript develops a conceptual framework first publicly recorded on 31 July 2026 in the HibriMind Priority Note, *The Beast Is Not the Model: A Priority Note on the Distributed Ontology of Large AI Systems* [25]. The present draft distinguishes documentary priority from scientific validation and remains open to conceptual, technical, and empirical revision.